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MARCH-APRIL, 1962
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF EVIDENCE
By VANCE R. DITTMAN, JR.*
While the Supreme Court of Colorado decided the usual number
of cases in 1961 involving the rules of Evidence, only five cases
appear to be sufficiently significant to warrant comment as affect-
ing the admissibility of evidence in this state.
The case of Ruth v. Department of Highways1 adds one further
principle to the existing law relating to the determination of the
value of realty affected in condemnation proceedings. Ruth owned
about 200 acres of mountain land and the condemnation action was
brought to acquire a right of way 190 feet wide for the construction
of a highway. This would take a total of about 2 acres of Ruth's
land, located on flat ground at the bottom of a canyon. The re-
mainder of his land, not taken, was a steep slope above the land
taken, on which was an old mine tunnel, not presently being oper-
ated. Ruth contended that taking of the right of way would destroy
the value of the remainder of his 200 acres by taking the only land
on which waste could be dumped if mining operations should be re-
sumed, using the tunnel to remove the debris from a mining loca-
tion not owned by Ruth but situated about 1000 feet from the breast
of the tunnel.
The sole question determined by the court was whether or not
the trial court had properly excluded evidence relating to the value
of the property not taken. This evidence, as shown by an offer of
proof, would have shown that negotiations had been under way
with a group of persons to finance the extension of the tunnel to
the mining claim, but that when the condemnation action was
started the negotiations were discontinued because the other parties
felt that after the condemnation the property would be worthless.
Ruth also offered to prove that the operation of the claim would
be profitable and that the opening and use of the tunnel would be
feasible.
The supreme court approved the action of the trial court in
excluding this evidence. As to the negotiations to finance the ex-
tension, which apparently included a possible purchase of the en-
tire property, the court pointed out that these negotiations never
progressed to the point of sale or even to a firm offer to purchase.
For that reason such evidence was not relevant to establish the
value of the property. As to the evidence designed to establish the
basis for a profitable operation of the mining claim, the court held
that this was too remote and too speculative and that settlement
sheets relating to the operation of the mine more than 20 years
before to show the value of the ore removed from the mine in its
earlier operations was properly excluded.
This decision is not inconsistent with the well established rule
that the owner is entitled to have the jury consider the most ad-
vantageous use to which the land may be applied in the future, be-
cause that rule also excludes the allowance of speculative damages.
* Professor of Low, University of Denver Low, Center.
1 359 P.2d 1033 (Colo. 1961).
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The case of Jones v. People2 raises an interesting question rela-
tive to the admissibility of a statement made by the defendant fol-
lowing his arrest. Jones was arrested and signed a written state-
ment detailing the circumstances of a vicious assault which he had
made upon one Powell with a hammer and a large pipe wrench,
followed by the robbery of the hotel in which the assault occurred
and where Powell worked. At the time Jones made this statement
he was unaware of the fact that Powell had died as a result of the
beating. Jones was charged with murder, tried and convicted, the
jury fixing the penalty at death. At the trial the statement made by
Jones was admitted into evidence, presumably over his objection.
Counsel for Jones argued that the admission of this statement was
error, because it was a confession of robbery (with which Jones
was not charged), but that it was not a confession of murder, since
Jones did not then know that Powell had died. He also argued that
it could not even be an admission that Jones had killed Powell, but
only that he had hit him-not that the blow had caused his death.
From this it followed, argued defendant's counsel, that the state's
case was wholly circumstantial-lacking a confession-and that the
trial court erred in not giving a tendered instruction on circum-
stantial evidence.
The supreme court held that if the natural consequences of
Jones' unlawful act would likely cause death, a statement that he
did such act (beat Powell) from which the victim later died "would
be a damning confession." Since the natural and probable conse-
quences of Jones' assault on Powell were death and since Jones
acknowledged doing these acts, his statement amounted to an in-
gredient of a felony-murder. The court then reaffirmed a rule an-
nounced in an earlier case that "A confession is an acknowledg-
ment in express words, by the accused in a criminal case, of the
truth of the guilty fact charged or of some essential part of it .... -
and went on to hold that Jones' signed statement was a confession,
and, being supported by corroborating evidence relating to its con-
tents, it was not merely circumstantial evidence.
The case also involved another important point of evidence
having to do with the admission of some items of demonstrative
evidence. Of particular interest was the use of Powell's blood-
stained shirt. The court pointed out that the admission of such evi-
dence without a showing of some use beyond merely displaying it
to the jury might have been prejudicial, but that the shirt having
been introduced because the blood on it indicated that the stains
came from a person having the same type of blood as Powell's its
admission was not improper and that Jones could not assign the
ruling as error.
Hammil v. People4 deals with the scope of allowable cross ex-
amination of an expert witness. A psychiatrist testified, as a witness
for the state, concerning the mental conditiofi of the defendant. His
testimony was based entirely on his own observations of the de-
fendant and his opinion was formed and stated with reference to
his own observations alone. The trial court refused to permit the
2 360 P.2d 686 (Colo. 1961).
3 Id. ot 690.
4 361 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1961).
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defendant's counsel to cross examine the psychiatrist regarding his
use of the report of a psychologist, who had conducted certain
psychological tests on the defendant, since the trial court found
that the psychiatrist had not used this report in forming his opinion.
The cross examination was designed to bring out the contents of
the psychologist's report to show that defendant had such a low
grade mentality as to preclude his responsibility for his conduct.
The supreme court affirmed the ruling of the trial court and pointed
out that the psychologist's report had no tendency whatever to dis-
credit either the psychiatrist's statement that he had -relied solely
on his own observations or to discredit his own opinion. On the
contrary, to permit this cross examination would have served only
to place its hearsay contents before the jury in such a way as to
give them testimonial status. The court distinguishes this case from
that of Archina v. People5 in which the expert's opinion was based
partly on hearsay, and cross examination in the matter was allowed.
A question of first impression in Colorado was presented in the
case of De Gesualdo v. People.6 The defendant was convicted of
burglary and conspiracy to commit burglary. At the trial the de-
fendant's co-conspirator was called as a witness by the prosecution.
The co-conspirator's name had been endorsed as a witness in the
case, but there were circumstances present which indicated that
the district attorney could not have possibly entertained a good
faith belief that the witness would testify if called. He either had
a groundless hope that the witness would have a change of heart
and would testify or he hoped to get before the jury the fact that
the witness believed that his testimony would be incriminating. The
witness refused to testify, claiming his privilege against self in-
crimination. In reversing the conviction the supreme court pointed
out that the effect of such a device is clear and that the conduct
of the district attorney constituted a studied attempt to bring to
the attention of the jury the fact that the defendant's co-conspirator
did not intend to testify for fear of the consequences to himself.
The court held that this staged incident, absent the showing of good
faith on the part of the district attorney in calling him and absent
any instruction by the court to the jury to disregard this by-play,
had a prejudicial effect on the rights of the defendant. The problem
was not one of competency of an accomplice to testify (his com-
petency was conceded), but, rather, whether he could be called for
the purpose of extracting from him a claim of privilege against
incrimination. Faced with a paucity of authority, the supreme court
relied upon a number of Texas cases which had held that the sort
of conduct practiced in this case was prejudicial and grounds for
reversal, at least where no cautionary instruction was given. The
court made the following interesting comment: "In holding that
the conduct in question was reversible error, we take notice that
in the public mind an odium surrounds the claim of constitutional
privilege by a witness in refusing to testify on the ground that his
testimony would tend to incriminate him. This is an aggravating
factor."
5 135 Colo. 8, 307 P.2d 1083 (1957).
6 364 P.2d 374 (Colo. 1961).
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Once again the supreme court has been called upon to consider
the effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof and it seems
to have indicated that it continues to approve its now well estab-
lished rule that the existence of a presumption in favor of the
plaintiff shifts the burden of proof to the defendant on the parti-
cular issue as to which the presumption arose.7 In Bankers Ware-
house Company v. Bennett8 the plaintiff, having stored some nut
meats with the defendant, was entitled to rely upon the presump-
tion of negligence on the part of the bailee (the defendant) which
arises, as here, when the goods are damaged while in storage. After
recognizing the existence of this presumption in favor of the plain-
tiff, bailor, the court then said: ". . . the burden of going forward
with evidence to overcome this presumption rested on the defend-
ant."9 This expresses the rule which is well established in most
jurisdictions and which recognizes that the burden of proof never
shifts from the plaintiff, but that the presumption temporarily
satisfies this burden, and thus places on the defendant the burden
of producing evidence. It does not shift the burden of proof, often
referred to as the risk of non-persuasion. If the court had stopped
there it would have aligned itself with the general conception of
the effect of presumptions. But the court did not stop there. It went
on to say:
Here it was incumbent upon the defendant to show that
the nut meats were not contaminated by reason of its negli-
gence. This it failed to do.
The effect of the rule requiring the bailee to meet the pre-
sumption of negligence arising under such circumstances,
is to place the burdenupon the one best able to discharge
it .... 10
This rule clearly shifts the burden of proof (as distinguished
from the burden of producing evidence) to the defendant. Had the
court simply said that the presumption in favor of the plaintiff
satisfied his burden of proof at that point, and thus placed upon
the defendant the burden of producing evidence to overcome the
presumption in favor of the plaintiff, there would have been no
confusion, and if the defendant had failed to meet his burden of
7 E.g., McGee v. Helm, 362 P.2d 193 (Colo. 1961).
8 365 P.2d 889 (Colo. 1961).
9 Id. at 891.
10 Ibid. (Emphasis supplied).
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going forward the plaintiff would have been entitled to a favorable
verdict. As it is now, the defendant, having the burden of proof,
must satisfy the jury, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that
he was not negligent." This relieves the plaintiff of his initial bur-
den of proof to show that the defendant was negligent and works
greatly to his advantage. The statute referred to in the case imposes
upon the bailee no more than the duty to use reasonable care, and
frees him from liability which could not have been avoided by the
exercise of such care. Under the statute the plaintiff bailor must
prove that the bailee did not use reasonable care; under the doctrine
that the presumption shifts the burden of proof, the bailee must
show that he used due care. This makes a substantial change in the
substantive law under the statute.
The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof has been
stated by many well reasoned decisions, and the following quota-
tions from some of the more representative opinions are enlighten-
ing.
In Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp.
12
the United States Supreme Court used this language, in a case in-
volving a bailment:
The burden of proof in a litigation, wherever the law
has placed it, does not shift with the evidence, and in deter-
mining whether petitioner has sustained the burden the
question often is, as in this case, what inferences of fact
he may summon to his aid. In answering it in this, as in
others where breach of duty is the issue, the law takes into
account the relative opportunity of the parties to know the
fact in issue and to account for the loss which it is alleged
is due to the breach. Since the bailee in general is in a
better position than the bailor to know the cause of the loss
and to show that it was one not involving the bailee's lia-
bility, the law lays on him the duty to come forward with
the information available to him. (Citing cases.) If the
bailee fails, it leaves the trier of fact free to draw an infer-
ence unfavorable to him upon the bailor's establishing the
unexplained failure to deliver the goods safely. (Citing
cases.)
Whether we label this permissible inference with the
equivocal term 'presumption' or consider merely that it is
a rational inference from the facts proven, it does no more
than require the bailee, if he would avoid the inference, to
go forward with evidence sufficient to persuade that the
non-existence of the fact, which would otherwise be in-
ferred, is as probable as its existence. It does not cause the
11 See also Schierenbeck v. Minor, 367 P.2d 333 (Colo. 1961) where the court used this language:
"A child born to a woman married at the time of its conception is by law presumed to be legitimate.
[Citing cases.) Mary [the mother] was confronted with this presumption of legitimacy and its effect.
To overcome it she had to prove that Sedillo [her husband] 'had no access to her during the time
when, according to the course of nature, he could be the father of the child ..... '" This, however
does not affect the burden of proof, since the plaintiff had to establish that the defendant was the
father of the child born out of wedlock, and the presumption in favor of legitimacy operates in
favor of the defendant, thus merely increasing the burden already resting on the plaintiff, requiring
her to prove that the defendant is the father and that her husband is not. The defendant never had
an obligation to do more than meet the evidence offered by the plaintiff. He had no burden of
proof on any issue.
12 314 U.S. 104 (1941).
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burden of proof to shift, and if the bailee does go forward
with evidence enough to raise doubts as to the validity of
the inference, which the trier of fact is unable to resolve,
the bailor does not sustain the burden of persuasion which
upon the whole evidence remains upon him, where it rested
at the start.'
3
The New York Court of Appeals has used this language: 14
In the case at bar the plaintiff made out her cause of
action prima facie by the aid of a legal presumption (refer-
ring to res ipsa loquitur), but when the proof was all in
the burden of proof had not shifted, but was still upon the
plaintiff.... If the defendant's proof operated to rebut the
presumption upon which the plaintiff relied, or if it left the
essential fact of negligence in doubt and uncertainty, the
party who made that allegation should suffer, and not her
adversary. The jury were bound to put the facts and cir-
13 Id. at 110-11.
14 Kay v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 163 N.Y. 447, 57 N.E. 751 (1900).
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cumstances proved by the defendant into the scale against
the presumption upon which the plaintiff relied, and in
determining the weight to be given to the former as against
the latter, they were bound to apply the rule that the
burden of proof was upon the plaintiff. If, on the whole,
the scale did not preponderate in favor of the presumption
and against defendant's proof, the plaintiff had not made
out her case, since she had failed to meet and overcome the
burden of proof.
Perhaps the clearest exposition of the rule as to the effect of
a presumption upon the burden of proof to be found in any reported
case is that of Judge Rodney in Delaware Coach Co. v. Savage.15
He said:
The burden of proof rests upon the party asserting the
affirmative of an issue, such as, in this case, the negligence
of the defendants. If an allegation, such as the negligence
of the defendant, be alleged, the party asserting such fact
must prove it by a preponderance of the evidence. The
burden of proof of such fact continues throughout the case
and this burden of proof never shifts. The burden of going
forward with the evidence may shift from time to time
during a trial after the establishing of a prima facie case or
due to some other development in the case, but the burden
of proof of the main fact remains with the party who al-
leged such main fact.
Upon the establishment of a prima facie case the bur-
den of evidence or the burden of going forward with the
evidence shifts to the defensive party. It then becomes
incumbent upon such defensive party to meet the prima
facie case which has been established. For this purpose the
defensive party need not produce evidence which prepon-
derates or outweighs or surpasses the evidence of his ad-
versary, but it is sufficient if such evidence is co-equal,
leaving the proof in equilibrium. If the defensive party,
either by a preponderance of evidence or evidence suffi-
cient to establish equilibrium, has met and answered the
prima facie case, then the burden of going forward with
the evidence returns to the original proponent charged
with the burden of proof who must in turn, by a prepon-
derance or greater weight of evidence, overcome the equili-
brium thus established, or otherwise support his burden of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence. This is true
whether the original prima facie case is founded upon af-
firmative evidence or established by the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur or other presumption or inference of law.1 6
It would be of great benefit to the profession if the rule as to
the effect of presumptions on the burden of proof could be clarified
in Colorado. The rule as illustrated by the above cases seems to
work well and is logical, and it also avoids some of the most puz-
zling aspects of a question which has become more confused than
is warranted.
15 81 F. Supp. 293 (D. Del. 1948).
16 Id. at 296. (Emphasis supplied).
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